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For serious readers of English literature, the early and mid-career novels 
of Henry James (Roderick Hudson, The American, The Portrait of a Lady) 
are not enough. The ultimate challenge is the later ones (The Wings of 
the Dove, The Ambassadors, The Golden Bowl), which are longer, more 
ornately written and less action-driven. Indeed, for hundreds and 
hundreds of pages, nothing seems to happen in them and by the end we 
seem to be back where we started. Of course, we are already used to 
this from mid-period James. In The American (1877), the Boston 
millionaire Charles Newman decides not to reveal the de Bellegarde’s 
incriminating family secret, despite them thwarting his marriage to their 
daughter Claire. In The Portrait of a Lady (1881), Isabel Archer gives up 
the eligible Caspar Goodwood and inexplicably decides to return to her 
loveless marriage to the effete and pretentious Gilbert Osmonde and his 
daughter Pansy. In The Aspern Papers (1880), our nameless narrator 
decides not to marry the niece of the poet Jeffrey Aspern’s recently 
deceased former lover, even though this would allow him access to his 
long sought-after papers. And in the three great late novels, to adopt a 
kind of Jamesian locution, nothing also seems to happen, only more so. 
In The Wings of the Dove (1902), the impoverished writer Merton 
Densher not only fails to accept heiress Milly Theale’s generous bequest 
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given to him so that he might marry the beautiful Kate Croy, but Kate 
arguably refuses him for not doing so. In The Ambassadors (1903), the 
middle-aged Lambert Strether sent over to France by the wealthy widow 
Mrs Newman to fetch her wayward son Chad not only fails to bring him 
home but also to marry the eligible Madame de Vionnet. Finally, in The 
Golden Bowl (1904), the two appropriate couples either fail to get married 
or fail in getting married, then fail to split up and carry on unhappily, with 
one couple (Maggie Verver and Prince Amerigo) remaining in Europe 
and the other (Charlotte Stant and Maggie’s father, Adam) returning to 
America. 
 This is James’ famous “late style”, which has been the subject of so 
much scholarly attention and, as we suggest, is currently experiencing 
something of a revival, at least in “advanced” theoretical circles. After all, 
it is not the obvious Portrait of a Lady that Slavoj Žižek decided to write 
about when he wanted to think the ethical “act” in James, but the almost 
20-year later Wings of the Dove. What, however, is really going on in 
these late-period productions? Needless to say, there are any number of 
explanations. For Seymour Chatman, coming out of English literature 
and writing in the early 1970s, it is a matter of a particular textual style. As 
he puts it in The Late Style of Henry James: “The effect of abstractness 
probably cannot be dissociated from others that arise in the reading of 
James, in particular a distinctive kind of vague allusiveness, usually the 
product of extensive and radical ellipsis”.1 This “formalist” consensus, we 
might say, reigned for some three decades. It has perhaps been 
surpassed only recently by the American aesthetic philosopher Robert 
Pippin, who coming out of a post-Cavellian enquiry into philosophical 
scepticism argues that what is at stake in late James is the status of 
moral and ethical conventions in a time of rapidly increasing modernity. 
As he writes in Henry James and Modern Moral Life:  
In exploring such a ‘moral reaction’, in trying to figure out its status, 
what makes it possible and effective, James wants to frame the 
problem in a self-consciously historical and social way.2 
And this ethical line of questioning has been both continued and 
repositioned in the work of a number of Lacanians, who have come to 
James and sought to read his work along the lines of Lacan’s 
theorisation of the ethical act, as laid out in his Seminar VII. There is first 
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of all Sigi Jottkandt, who in Acting Beautifully: Henry James and Ethical 
Aesthetics argues that in the late James “various characters perform an 
aesthetic feat that meets the conditions of the Lacanian ethical act”.3 And 
this is followed by Žižek, who in the chapter ‘Kate’s Choice, or, The 
Materialism of Henry James’ in Parallax View begins by disagreeing with 
Jöttkandt, contending instead that “Kate’s ‘No’ at the novel’s end is the 
properly Kierkegaardian moment in which the ethical itself is the 
temptation”.4 
 We do not simply disagree with these readings here, but prefer 
rather to emphasise another aspect of the late James. It is something 
that is not often drawn attention to in contemporary readings of them, 
insofar as it is seen to be out of touch with their formal difficulty, narrative 
complexity and moral ambiguity. And this is the question of love. How is 
love figured there and what are its consequences? Needless to say, love 
is very much at stake in these late novels. In Wings of the Dove, there is 
the love between Kate and Densher, allowed and even encouraged by 
Milly, who also loved Densher. In The Ambassadors, there is the love 
between Strether and Maria Gostrey and Chad and Mme. de Vionnet, 
who also in a way loves Strether. In The Golden Bowl, there is the love 
between Charlotte and her ex-boyfriend Amerigo and between Maggie 
and her father and even between the two women. However, the real 
question is – given that too-obviously physical descriptions are prohibited 
and the relationships are often impossible or exist only in the minds of 
the characters – what could be meant by love? Or, to put this more 
specifically and to begin a certain taxonomy of love, what is the 
relationship between the one who loves and the one who is loved? Is 
love necessarily doomed to a lack of fulfilment, arguably like the sexual 
relationship? How might we describe a “successful” as opposed to an 
unsuccessful love relationship? And can we even say that we have a 
series of “successful” love relationships in James, despite the 
appearance of nothing happening in them and against the consensus of 
the critics, who by and large argue that they are unsuccessful when they 
do not simply ignore them? 
 To answer these questions, we might begin – like nearly all critics 
on James – by thinking the meaning of a particular feature of his writerly 
style. It is one that, to our knowledge, has not previously been 
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commented upon – at least, specifically – by critics.5 Nevertheless, it is 
one that is virtually ubiquitous throughout his work, and especially in the 
later novels. Indeed, we might even suggest that it is something like this 
feature that constitutes the peculiar feeling of at once everything and 
nothing happening in the later James, a sense that the novel could 
potentially go on forever without anything actually happening. In fact, it is 
something like this impossible equivalence between everything and 
nothing that not only constitutes the distinctive tone but makes up the 
actual “drama” of the novels. Take, for instance, what Kate’s sister says to 
Kate after she first meets Densher in Wings of the Dove: “I talk of him, just 
because you don’t”.6 Or the conversation between Maria Gostrey and 
Strether towards the middle of The Ambassadors while both are waiting 
for Chad: “Well, I’m impossible. It’s impossible. Everything’s impossible”. 
“Everything’s possible”.7 Or the following exchange between Maggie and 
her father towards the end of The Golden Bowl after Maggie discovers 
Charlotte’s restarting her affair with Amerigo: “Why, I sacrifice you, simply 
to everything and to everyone”. “What do you make, then, of what I 
wanted?” “I don’t make anything, any more than of what you’ve got. 
That’s exactly the point”.8 
 But it is an uncanny equivalence of or even substitutability 
between “everything” and “nothing” that must be understood very 
carefully. It is perhaps tempting to suggest that after all of the apparent 
events of the novels we end up exactly where we started with nothing 
changed, but that is not quite true. For, in a subtle way, everything is 
different and nothing is the same. If it is the same eventless and even 
loveless world with which we began, it is now only possible insofar as it 
has gone through these virtual or unrealised events. And something like 
this is the entire “method” of James’ narratives, which rather than working 
through any kind of gradual build-up of suspense or logical cause-and-
effect operate through a series of doublings, each rising up a level and 
appearing as the retrospective explanation of everything that came 
before. We discover another reason for the way things are, which we did 
not realise before, that now serves as the true explanation for preceding 
events, even though it cannot exactly be made clear. We might just 
provide an example of this for each of the novels we treat here. In Wings 
of the Dove, Milly speculates with regard to a possible affair between 
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Kate and Densher: “It was fantastic of her to let it make a difference that 
she couldn’t at the least have defined – and she was rather proud of 
being able to hide, on the spot, the difference it did make” (124). In The 
Ambassadors, Strether says of Mme. de Vionnet, meeting her again after 
discovering the nature of her relationship with Chad: “He felt what he had 
before with her, that there was always more behind what she showed, 
and more and more again behind that” (349). And in The Golden Bowl, 
Maggie admits to herself when coming upon evidence of her husband’s 
infidelity with Charlotte: “From the instant she should be able to convict 
him of intending, every issue would be closed and her hypocrisy would 
have to redouble” (356). 
 All this might be expressed another way: not as the sudden 
revelation of another reason for the way things are as they are, but more 
as the hiding or holding back of this reason. It would be a character’s 
realisation not of a different explanation even though nothing has 
actually happened, but rather of a different explanation that is revealed 
through the attempt to hide it or cover it over, which only draws attention 
to it all the more and before which we may not even say that it exists. We 
see this again in each of the novels where one character sees another 
attempt to hide something from them, or is able to understand another 
attempting to hide something from them, even though this other does 
not appear to be aware of them or of hiding something from them. In 
Wings of the Dove, Kate’s Aunt Maud and Mrs Stringham are speculating 
about Densher’s attraction to Milly, and when Densher denies it Aunt 
Maud replies: “Yet doesn’t silence in such a case very often quite prove 
the depth of the impression?” (222) In The Ambassadors, Strether while 
talking to Chad’s sister about Mme. de Vionnet and attempting to keep 
his feelings to himself realises: “What exposed him was just his poor old 
trick of quiet inwardness, what exposed him was his thinking such 
offense” (299). And in The Golden Bowl, Maggie explains to Amerigo how 
she first became aware of his infidelity: “Oh, the thing I’ve known best of 
all is that you never wanted, together, to offend us” (435). In each case 
here it is not anything that is actually done or able to be read in a 
particular way by the other, but it is this that reveals that the other has 
something to hide, that they are aware of being looked at and seek to 
hide something from this gaze. Their apparent indifference is not genuine 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 
(What does it mean to) Think the Novel? 
 
 96 
but rather only an attempt to cover something up. In fact, in many ways 
the two situations we have just outlined are the same. In both, the very 
absence of proof is proof. In the first, it is as though the world attempts to 
hide itself from a certain gaze; in the second, it is another character. But 
in both cases the character looking on is able to read what is as a 
response to them, not just obvious events (James barely deals with 
these), but the very absence of events. 
 We might ask, then, what produces the possibility of this plot by 
surmise or hypothesis, in which the events of the novel are not actually 
dramatised but imaginatively assumed, where nothing appears to take 
place and yet this nothing stands in for everything. A clue might be found 
in a well-known statement by James about the particular power of art. It 
is exactly about the ability of art to create those moments we have been 
speaking of, to make anything signify and be meaningful. James once 
wrote in a letter to H.G. Wells in 1915 in an attempt to explain his 
“method” (and we suggest that this applies not only to James’ novel-
writing project as a whole but to the creation of specific incidents in his 
novels): “It is art that makes life, makes interest, makes imagination, for 
our consideration and application of these things”.9 And throughout 
James’ novels, in what we might designate as something of a 
“mousetrap” effect, we have characters at the highest moments of 
drama, or realising that there now is a whole other explanation for the 
events they are experiencing, exclaiming that they feel like a character in 
a novel or on the stage. As Milly says to herself upon first being 
introduced to Kate in Wings of the Dove: “She placed this striking young 
person from the first in a story” (114). Or as Strether reflects immediately 
after coming upon Chad and Mme. de Vionnet together in The 
Ambassadors: “Nothing was, so far as surface and sound were involved, 
even in question; surface and sound all made for their common 
ridiculous good fortune, for the general invraisemblance of the occasion” 
(335). Or as Maggie says to Amerigo after buying for her father the same 
cracked golden bowl he and Charlotte had originally looked at in The 
Golden Bowl: “I agree with you that the coincidence is extraordinary – the 
sort of thing that happens mainly in novels and plays” (432). In each case 
here, we want to suggest that not only do the events not exist – obviously 
– until they have been narrated, but that they exist only as their narration. 
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Or, to put it another way, what is actually occurring in each of these 
situations, what we might say the characters suddenly realise, is their fall 
into the symbolic order. But, again, what is at that moment also realised, 
along the lines of what we have previously suggested, is that they have 
always been in the symbolic order, that what is is possible from the 
beginning only because it stands in for another. 
 However, let us step back a little at this point and put the question 
otherwise. We might think another way when these moments in James 
arise. When is it that his characters suddenly realise that the world is full 
of meaning and responds to their gaze, whether by directly revealing 
itself to them or by seeking to hide itself from them? When does nothing 
the other does escape their notice, either by revealing hidden depths to 
be seen or by attempting to cover itself over? Again, allow us briefly to 
recount the three examples spoken of above. In Wings of the Dove, Milly 
has just been introduced to Kate. In The Ambassadors, Strether has just 
realised that Chad and Mme. de Vionnet are having an affair. In The 
Golden Bowl, Maggie has just found out that Charlotte and her husband 
have resumed their relationship. In each case, to pick up on the 
suggestion we made above, we would say it occurs when one of the 
characters is in love with another. It is exactly in the circumstances of 
love that the loved one is unable to be indifferent, either because they 
actually are not or because their indifference is able to be read as a 
response to the one who loves them. That is to say, when the lover looks 
at the loved one they can always see a response to them, an 
acknowledgement of their love. It will appear that the other is aware of 
them even in their indifference because this indifference can always be 
understood as an attempt to hide something from their gaze. But then it 
is possible that the loved one does in fact become aware of being looked 
at. How in that case should they react if they wish to reciprocate their 
love, if they love the one who loves them? As James’ novels teach us, 
only by looking back. So that the loved one is not merely looking back at 
the lover, even in not looking back, but actively returning the gaze. With 
the result that the gaze is not merely one- but always two-way. And the 
lover can then in turn acknowledge this, see that the loved one is looking 
back at them. It is perhaps only this situation that we would properly call 
love. It is all that Robert Pippin means when he describes a certain 
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exchange of looks in James in his After the Beautiful: Hegel and the 
Philosophy of Pictorial Modernism:  
 In a conversation in a Henry James novel, a character A can see in 
the face of character B not only that B knows that A has revealed some 
confidence, but that B knows that A knows that B knows”.10Indeed, along 
the lines of previous critics on James, we would like to connect what we 
are saying here to Lacan, but not to Lacan’s Seminar VII on ethics but to 
his Seminar VIII, ostensibly on the subject of transference, but which 
features a long first section consisting of a detailed reading of Plato’s 
Symposium, entitled ‘The Mainspring of Love’. In a sense, that is, we 
would want to suggest that there is something of Plato’s Symposium 
about James’ later novels, which as we have observed feature not any 
actual love but rather a lot of talk about love. (Indeed, at one point in his 
Seminar, Lacan admits that “it is impossible not to immediately include 
the term ‘fiction’ in the function of transference”.11) Moreover, Lacan 
describes the setting or scenario of Plato’s original symposium in terms 
that recall James’ intimate dramas: “It is a ceremony, with rules, a sort of 
ritual, intimate contest among the elite, or parlour game” (20-1). He even 
goes on to describe the look and type of its participants in terms that are 
reminiscent of James: “It is always in sitting rooms, in other words, where 
people are not especially good-looking, at the homes of duchesses, in 
the course of the evening, that the most refined things are said” (41). But, 
beyond this, we might say that James operates, much like Socrates 
before him, as something of an analyst of love, which subject, as Lacan 
makes clear, lies “at the beginning of analytic practice” (4). It is an 
analysis, however, that does not offer any final truth of the phenomenon – 
or even definitively stands outside of the effects of love – but functions 
more as a momentary stopping point in the endless self-referral of the 
signifier, or as we might put it the endless exchange of looks between the 
two parties in the love relationship. As Lacan says in Seminar VIII, with 
“signifier” here standing in for those looks: “The existence of an 
unconscious signifying chain stems from the sole position of the term 
‘subject’ qua determined as a subject by the fact that he props up the 
signifier” (169). But, then, as Lacan goes on to make clear, if in one way it 
is the “subject” that plays the role of the stopping point of the “infinite 
sliding” of the signifier – and thus occupies the place of the analyst – it is 
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also true that anything can play the role of this stopping point: “a 
circumstantial element, an aspect of activity, an element of the beyond or 
of the endpoint” (169). In a sense, that is, as we have seen, anything can 
function as that occasion around which a new hypothesis arises, as that 
for which all signifiers stand in or the secret explanation behind things. 
And furthermore, as Lacan goes on to make clear, this stopping point is 
only temporary. The unwinding of the signifying chain is no sooner 
stopped than it starts up again, or even we might say this stopping is to 
start up again. This is why, once more, the analyst represents no final 
truth of the signifier, but is merely the attempt to “grasp the moment at 
which a shift or reversal [in the effects of language on the subject] 
occurs” (34).  
 We might perhaps start again. Lacan in his reading of Plato’s 
Symposium makes a surprising point about love. Indeed, it is one he 
repeats many times throughout his Seminar. It is that love, in his words, 
comes “in the beginning” (4). Or, as he puts it a little later, it is a form of 
“creationism” (5). Or, as he adds almost immediately, it arises “ex nihilo” 
(5). By this he means that love does not come about as any gradual 
accumulation or building up of feeling, but as a sudden jump or change 
of state. It is not any kind of deduction or conclusion logically arrived at, 
but more a radical and unverifiable hypothesis that changes everything, 
and that once proposed cannot be denied. This is why, along with the 
idea of love arising “ex nihilo, it is always a matter of love existing in a 
“second power” (12). And this is why Lacan can speak of the “miracle” of 
love consisting in the fact that, “insofar as [the lover’s] hand extends”, a 
“hand [the beloved’s] appears on the other side” (52). That is to say, once 
the hypothesis of love has been made, the other cannot but be seen 
putting out their hand, which is also to say that in retrospect the lover is 
not seen putting out their hand after until the other responds. In a 
surprising sense, that is, love – authentic love – is never unreciprocated. 
Love is, as Lacan puts it, the “metaphor” or substitution of the lover 
(erastés) for the loved one (erómenos) (40). It is exactly as we see in 
James, in which anything the loved one does is able to be seen as 
evidence that they are responding to the lover. And this is why again for 
Lacan anything is able to become that turning point around which the 
hypothesis of love occurs. However, importantly, as he goes on to argue, 
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despite all of this love is a matter not of two becoming one, but rather of 
one becoming two.12 By this Lacan means that, if the lover is able to 
project onto the loved one so that anything they do can be understood 
as a response to or reflection of their gaze upon them, in another way the 
loved one being looked at is able to take this into account and as it were 
return the gaze, so that anything the lover does can be seen to be a 
reflection of them. But, of course, the lover can then in turn take this into 
account, and so on. The real point is that the apparent indifference of the 
world and of the lovers within it is permanently split by the hypothesis of 
some secret explanation behind it, which belongs finally to no one and 
can never definitively be taken into account. 
 It is this that Pippin means by that cascading series of glances 
between A and B in his description, and why for him they are not 
reciprocal, with one reflecting the other, but instead each doubles the 
other, operates as its hidden explanation. In other words, that series of 
looks is not merely successive or progressive, with one following the 
other, but rather regressive or retrospective, with each casting itself as 
the cause or explanation of the one before. As Pippin writes in After the 
Beautiful:  
 He [the character in a fiction] does not see some evidence, on the 
 basis of which he makes an inference… Whatever this form of 
 intelligibility is, it is not inferential, is in some literal sense ‘seen’.13 
And it is for this reason that we say that it is not a matter of action in 
James, of any particular party acting on the basis of what they see. This 
is because by the time they see the other it is already too late. For it is 
possible that the other has already seen them, and they have not yet 
acted. In James, the time for action has already long passed, and all the 
various parties can do is plot behind their gaze while appearing not to. 
And again it is for this reason that for Lacan love is always a matter of 
two. The loved one is not simply a reflection of the lover, which is of 
course Imaginary. The one being looked at, if able to be read by the other 
as a reflection of their gaze, is also able to take this gaze into account. 
Their indifference, which can always be understood as put on for the 
other’s gaze, and thus revealing itself to it, can also truly hide something 
on the part of the loved one. That is, they are not merely looked at by the 
lover but return their gaze, while appearing to be unaware of being 
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looked at. In other words, the loved one is not merely in an Imaginary 
relationship with the lover, but also stands outside of it, looking on at it 
from somewhere else, as the lover also attempts to do. And this of course 
would be love as a matter not of one but of two, taking place not in the 
Imaginary but in the Symbolic. And then, of course – and it is this we see 
in James – the lover can see that the loved one is looking back, not 
actually unaware but pretending to be unaware. It is this that opens up 
the possibility not only that the loved one is looking back but they have 
already looked back, that the lover’s looking on at them is an effect of 
their looking at the lover, that the apparent power the lover has over the 
loved one is possible only to the extent that the loved one has power 
over the lover. And it is perhaps this final step that is love in the Real, 
which is each party attempting to step out of the Imaginary relationship 
between them and adopt a Symbolic distance, but then realising that this 
distance is itself already taken account of, and moreover arises as a 
result of being taken account of, by the other. 
 It is all of this that Lacan means when he speaks of the way that in 
love A becomes a, that the ultimate aim of love is to make the Big Other 
into a partial object: “The most shocking secret is unveiled before 
everyone; the ultimate mainspring of desire, which in love relations must 
always be more or less dissimulated, is revealed – its aim is the fall of the 
Other, A, into the other, a” (176). It is exactly that idea we spoke of before 
that each attempt to stand outside of the exchange of looks between the 
lover and the loved one, to be that A or Big Other that serves as its final 
explanation, is shown to be merely a momentary step within a larger 
game, that is, a small a or partial object, insofar as it needs be explained 
by another. It is not that there is no Big A, but that each successive big A 
is revealed to be merely a small a, not a unified subject but merely what 
stands in for the subject. And here again the simultaneity of the stopping 
and sliding of that chain of looks or signifiers that Lacan speaks of: “It is 
precisely inasmuch as something presents itself as enhancing this 
infinite sliding…that it takes on the value of a privileged object that puts a 
stop to the infinite sliding” (170). And it is perhaps in this way too that we 
might understand Lacan when he speaks of the way that, although love 
is never unreciprocated, and that “insofar as the lover’s hand extends” a 
“hand appears on the other side”, nevertheless the lover both gives to the 
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loved one “what they do not have” and the loved one reveals a “lack in 
the lover” (34, 121). The lover is able to give the loved one what they do 
not have insofar as they do not know how the loved one will respond in 
advance. It is not anything particular that the loved one need do to 
indicate that they are responding to the lover, but anything at all. It is in 
this sense that the lover gives them what they do not have because they 
do not have to know in advance the meaning of what they are doing. 
They appear to express – in an unconscious brought about by the lover’s 
transference on to them – what they did not know they knew. Equally, 
however, when the loved one looks back to return the lover’s gaze, the 
lover in a matching counter-transference is forced to admit that they do 
not know everything about the loved one, that there is something that the 
loved one is truly hiding from them and that they cannot guess. The lover 
realises that the very effect of being able to give the loved one what they 
do not have is that the loved one is able to reveal a certain lack in them. 
 It is all of this that we see in the famous scene at the end of Wings 
of the Dove, which is discussed by Žižek in his ‘Kate’s Choice’ and many 
others and is undoubtedly one of the great scenes of “love” in James and 
all of literature. To briefly recount the circumstances: Milly upon her death 
bequests money to Densher, notice of which arrives by lawyer’s letter to 
him while he is staying in London after Milly’s death, where he 
occasionally sees Kate, who is travelling throughout Europe. Of course, in 
this gesture it can be understood that Milly realised the real intention 
behind Densher’s desire to marry her while she was ill, which is that after 
her death he would inherit her money and he and Kate would then be 
free to marry unimpeded by the only thing stopping them, which is their 
lack of money. It is, of course, as though all along Milly knew of Densher’s 
and Kate’s intentions. That behind her apparent ignorance or naiveté she 
already knew everything. And it is undoubtedly supremely disillusioning 
for both Densher and Kate that their gaze upon Milly has been returned 
in this way. And that Milly wreaks her revenge – the only one possible 
within the love relationship – not by immediately reacting, protesting 
against their plans (which could always be understood as a form of love), 
but by looking back at them. Making clear to them that she realised what 
they were doing, that she was aware of their look upon her, all along. 
That in fact her apparent indifference was not revealing but hid 
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something truly “abysmal” (124). It had always been a secret between 
Densher and Kate, in a way unspeakable between them – “the need to 
bury in the dark blindness of each other’s arms the knowledge of each 
other that they couldn’t undo” – but it was clear that Milly saw it 
throughout, and her lawyer’s letter to Densher makes it apparent – this 
again is Lacan’s idea of love raised to the “second power”, that each 
successive gaze is not merely progressive but regressive, the 
retrospective explanation of everything that comes before – that it was in 
fact her idea that he fall in love with her. That Densher and Kate’s 
marriage was Milly’s idea and not their own.  
 It is undoubtedly for this reason that Densher, upon receiving the 
letter from the lawyers and guessing its import, decides not to open it 
himself but send it on to Kate. It is suddenly difficult for him to accept the 
money, knowing that Milly knows. He would only be able to do so insofar 
as he did not know, as though she had died unaware and left him the 
money. This would be the idea that Milly as the loved one can always be 
seen to be reflective of Densher as her lover. That is to say, Milly’s 
apparently free decision to bequeath Densher her money after her death 
would have been secretly willed by Densher, following thus an 
implacable fate that he set out for her in advance. Now that this is no 
longer the case, with Milly looking back at him after her death, it can 
appear that his plans were an effect of her. That his plan to marry Kate 
with Milly’s money had been her desire from the beginning. Now no 
matter what he does his actions appear inadequate, not willed by him 
but needing to be explained for another reason. That is, if he accepts the 
money, he reveals himself to be calculating, mendacious and 
hypocritical in merely pretending to want to marry Milly when he wanted 
her only for her money. And if he does not accept, he is revealed as 
weak, unable to carry through with his plans and moreover still poor and 
ineligible. In both cases, he would be the kind of suitor neither Milly nor 
Kate would want to marry. In response to this dilemma, as we say, he 
sends the unopened lawyer’s letter to Kate, to ask her – this is his 
explanation and self-understanding – to make the decision he no longer 
wants to make nor indeed seems capable of making. 
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The concluding sequence of the novel begins when Kate enters 
Densher’s room where he waits in a kind of suspense, holding the 
lawyer’s letter, which she then puts on a table between them. If Densher 
manifests his love for her (as Milly did for Densher) by creating a situation 
in which anything she does is revealing of her, she is now returning his 
look. She is not merely looked at by Densher but looks back at him, and 
Densher can in turn see her looking back at him and she can in turn see 
that. It is this sequence of looks that Pippin outlines that we would say 
constitutes love in its proper sense. Kate states the situation in the 
following terms in the final pages of the novel and then the following 
conversation ensures: 
‘How can I touch it [the money] but through you?’ 
“You can’t. Any more”, he added, “than I can renounce it except 
through you”. 
“Oh, ever so much less! There’s nothing”, she said, “in my power”. 
“I’m in your power”, Merton Densher returned. 
“In what way?” 
“In the way I show – and the way I’ve always shown. When have I 
shown”, he asked with a sudden cold impatience, “anything else? 
You must surely feel – so that you needn’t wish to appear to spare 
me in it – how you ‘have’ me”. 
“It’s very good of you, my dear”, she nervously laughed, “to put me 
up so thoroughly to it!” 
“I put you up to nothing. I didn’t even put you up to the chance that, 
as I said a few moments ago, I saw for you in forwarding that thing. 
Your liberty is therefore in every way complete” (454). 
To all of this of course Densher has no adequate response. The letter as 
a partial object a is a beautiful example of love, which in Lacan’s terms 
arrives as soon as it is posted. It is not in anything the letter actually says 
that it (or love) arrives, but as soon as it is posted it arrives because the 
other can always be seen to be responding to it. Densher sends it to her, 
she brings it back, he gives it back to her again, and each time the one to 
whom it is given cannot avoid being seen to be responsible for it.  
 And so we want to say that Kate and Densher are never more in 
love than during this sequence in which each looks at each other without 
doing anything. Without doing anything because, as we suggest, their 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 
(What does it mean to) Think the Novel? 
 
 105 
silence, their indifference, is everything. Each thought doubles the other, 
being not merely the effect of what has come before but its retrospective 
explanation. Each party knows, or thinks they know, exactly what the 
other is thinking, but they can also think how this might be itself an effect 
of the apparent indifference of the other. It is an impasse – in Lacan’s 
analogy, a “poker game” (12) – only broken when Kate attempts to dispel 
the opening gaze of the sequence, which Densher has passed on to her: 
that of Milly onto Densher. She demands of him: “Your word of honour 
that you’re not in love with her memory”. To which Densher responds 
finally with decisive words of practical action: “”I’ll marry you, mind you, in 
an hour”. To which Kate asks: “As we were?” (456-7) And Densher 
confirms, repeating her words: “As we were”. But then famously and still a 
little enigmatically, their love is over, almost as suddenly as it arose. The 
break-up is described, following and as though coming out of Densher’s 
words, in the abrupt last lines of the novel, which now itself appears over 
too soon and requiring further explanation: “But she turned to the door, 
and her headshake was now the end. ‘We shall never be again as we 
were!’” (457). 
 Žižek in his reading of the novel indicates that for him the love 
between Kate and Densher ends earlier in the novel at that moment 
when Densher sends Kate the letter and asks her for her decision. What 
he faults Densher for, and what he implies Kate reacts negatively to, is 
Densher’s apparent hypocrisy in seeking to keep his actions from the Big 
Other. That is, in not accepting the money it would be as though Milly 
was not aware of his motivation in wanting to marry her, as though he 
could remain indifferent to her and not be seen by her. It is what Žižek 
calls the “temptation of the ethical” because it still works within the 
existing symbolic order and does not attempt to go beyond this order by 
means of a true ethical act. As he writes in ‘Kate’s Choice’: “Densher 
wants Kate neither to accept Milly’s bequest nor to reject it in a grand 
symbolic gesture but to join him in his hypocritical attempt to sell the 
refusal to choose as a choice”.14 But we for our part argue almost the 
opposite of this. We begin by locating the moment of the couple falling 
out of love a little later: not at all when Kate walks into Densher’s room 
with the letter, but only when Densher proposes marrying her, as though 
he could thereby get rid of Milly’s memory. And we would say that the 
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real issue at stake in the sequence is not that Densher fails to get rid of 
the Big Other in wanting to hide something from Milly, but rather that he 
succeeds too well in getting rid of the Big Other by directly declaring his 
love to Kate. And it is in fact Kate as much as anyone who is surprised by 
this. It is she, after all, who proposed to Densher that she would love him 
and allow him to accept the money on the condition that he gave up the 
memory of Milly, but when Densher attempts to do so – this is our 
reading of his offer to marry Kate, even though he does not say so 
explicitly – she no longer loves him. It is to make clear the idea that their 
love does proceed under the gaze of the Big Other, and that it is a matter 
not of them hiding from the Big Other but becoming themselves at each 
exchange of the gaze or objet a the Big Other, although this is 
retrospectively revealed each time as possible only because of another 
Big Other. Each of them can see everything, even what lies behind the 
apparent indifference or non-reaction of the other, but only because of a 
gaze preceding them. It is not that the Big Other is simply fixed and 
eternal, but rather there is an infinite sliding of Big Others, each falling 
into a from the position of another A. When Densher offers to marry Kate 
without Milly looking on, without the covering of the wings of the dove or 
the gaze of the Big Other, when they are forced to look at and 
understand each other directly without intermediaries or partial objects, it 
is all over. To love is to double. 
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